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Abstract
Business Processes for Web Services (BPEL4WS) are the new
paradigms for lightweight enterprise integration. They cross organiza-
tional boundaries and are provided by entities that see each other just
as business partners. Web services require shift in the access control
mechanism: from identity-based access control to trust management
and negotiation, but this is not enough for cross organizational busi-
ness processes. For many businesses no partner may guess a priori
what kind of credentials will be sent by clients and clients may not
know a priori which credentials are required for completing a business
process.
We propose a logical framework for reasoning about access control
for BPEL4WS and a BPEL4WS based implementation using Collaxa
server. Our model is based on interaction and exchange of requests
for supplying or declining missing credentials. We identify the formal
reasoning services (deduction, abduction, consistency checking) that
characterise the problem and discuss their implementation.
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1 Introduction
In the past millennium the development of middleware marked influenced
the IT sector efforts to integrate distributed resources of a corporation. The
new century has seen the rise of a new concept: virtual enterprises, the result
of the outsourcing trend of the last 10 years in the IT sector.
Conceptually, a virtual enterprise is born when a business process is not
longer closed within the boundary of a single corporation. It is composed by
partners that offer their services on the web and lightly integrate their efforts
into one (hopefully coherent) process.
To support the process of lightweight integration of partners’ resources,
a number of specifications and standards have emerged. SOAP and Web
Services Description Language1 (WSDL) help organisations in exposing their
basic functionalities as Web Services. Business Process Execution Language2
(BPEL4WS) and Electronic Business XML initiative3 (ebXML) describe the
behavior of complex business processes.
Intuitively, business processes are hierarchical graphs where each com-
posite node represents an orchestration activity and primitive nodes are Web
Services interfaces described in WSDL.
Considering the nature of a virtual enterprise – orchestration and chore-
ography of WS, global and local business processes, complex business trans-
actions – the picture gets complicated. Distributed processes, in a virtual
enterprise, become more dynamic, allowing new partners and services to be
selected at runtime.
The scenario offered by business processes for web services is particularly
challenging for the definition of its security features. It has aspects of trust
management systems and aspects of workflow security management.
From the trust management systems (see e.g. [20, 10, 17]) it takes the
credential-based view: a (web) service is offered on its own and the decision
to grant or deny access can only be made on the basis of the credentials sent
by the client. In contrast with trust management system, we have a process
and thus a notion of assignment of permissions to credentials that requires
to look beyond the single access decision.
From workflow access control systems (see e.g. [2, 4, 12, 13]) we borrow
all classical problems such as dynamic assignment of roles to users, dynamic
separation of duties, and assignment of permissions to users according the
least privilege principles. In contrast with workflow security management
schemes, a business process for web services crosses organizational boundaries
1WSDL–http://www.w3.org/TR/wsdl
2BPEL4WS–http://www-106.ibm.com/developerworks/webservices/library/ws-bpel
3ebXML Business Process Spec. – http://www.ebxml.org/specs/ebBPSS.pdf
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and is provided by entities that see each other as partners and nothing else.
We have something even more loosely coupled than federated databases.
Also, we can no longer assume that an enterprise will assign tasks and
roles to users (its employees) in a way that makes the completion of the
workflow possible w.r.t. its security constraints. The reason is that such
enterprise no longer exists. So, it must be possible for a user to communicate
missing credentials.
In this paper we propose a logical framework for reasoning about access
control for business processes for web services. We identify the different rea-
soning tasks (deduction, abduction, consistency checking) that characterize
the problem and clarify the problems of temporal evolution of the logical
model.
2 System Architecture
In this section we sketch the architecture of a system for distributed access
control for Web and Business Processes that we have implemented. We refer
to [14] for additional information on the rationale behind the architecture.
At the time of writing we have done an initial prototype including the main
entities of the system given below.
PolicyEvaluator makes endpoint decisions on access control. All partners
involved in a business process are likely to be as different entities, each
represented by a PolicyEvaluator. It encapsulates the partner’s specific
authorization policy, and presents it as a service using standardized
WS interface (e.g., WSDL).
PolicyOrchestrator is an entity responsible for the workflow level access and
release control. It decides which are the partners that are involved in
the requested service and on the basis of some orchestration security
policies combines the corresponding PolicyEvaluators in a form of a busi-
ness process that is suitable for execution by the AuthorizationServer.
AuthorizationServer is responsible for locating, executing, and managing all
needed PolicyEvaluators, and returning an appropriate result to the Ap-
plicationServer. Also it is responsible for managing all the interactions
with the Client.
At the application level, the architecture does not envisage the typical
exchange of messages in access control system: “data” level (credentials,
policies, requests, objects, etc.) that must be interpreted by the recipients.
We can exchange messages at “source code” level and in particular at the
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level of business process description. Partners exchanges “mobile” processes
(namely BPEL files) passing from one entity to another indicating themselves
what the recipient has to do.
The mobility of authorization processes has a number of advantages. First
of all, a server simply needs an off-the-shelf interpreter for business processes
for a quick implementation. Second, we have more flexibility for describing
the process leading to an access control decision.
To say few words on the implementation, Collaxa4 is used as a main
BPEL manager (on the AuthorizationServer side) for executing and managing
all policy composition processes returned by the PolicyOrchestrator, as well
as, for the implementation of the of the AuthorizationServer itself.
The AuthorizationServer itself is a BPEL process deployed under Collaxa
that internally deploys the policy process returned by the PolicyOrchestrator
as an internal web service and then also internally executes it. The advantage
in this case is that if the AuthorizationServer is requested to get an access
decision for a service that has already been asked for it and there is no
change in the workflow policy then the AuthorizationServer does not deploy
the service’s policy process again but just (internally) executes it. In that
way we speed up the access decision time.
PolicyOrchestrator in the current prototype is just a mapping between a
service resource and its workflow policy process. We assume that the the
process is already created by some GUI (e.g., could be used any BPEL visual
tool generator that actually connects all involved partners’ PEs in a BPEL
process) and is available to the orchestrator.
PolicyEvaluator is another key point in our system. In its core, it is a
Java module that acts as a wrapper for the DLV5 system and implements
our interactive algorithm for stateless WS described in Section 6.
3 The Formal Framework
Our formal model for reasoning on access control is based variants of Datalog
with the stable model semantics and combines in a novel way a number of
features
• logic for trust management by Li et al. [17];
• logic for workflow access control by Bertino et al. [4];
• logic for release and access control by Bonatti and Samarati [5].
4Collaxa BPEL Server – http://www.collaxa.com
5DLV System – http://www.dlvsystem.com
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We consider the view of a single partner since we cannot assume sharing
of policies between partners. In [14] it is explained how the entire process
can be orchestrated by using “mobile” business processes, while keeping each
partner policy decision process as a black-box.
In our framework each partner has a security policy for access control PA
and a security policy for disclosure control PD, whose syntax will be defined
later in section 5.
The policy for access control is used for making decision about usage
of all web services offered by the partner. We will use abduction to infer
the missing credentials from the access policy and the credentials already
presented by the user. The disclosure policy is used (as the name implies)
for controlling disclosure of credentials. Basically, we ask the client only the
missing credentials that are disclosable according to PD.
To execute a service of the fragment of a business process under the
control of the partner the user will submit a set of presented credentials CP ,
a set of declined credentials CN and a service request r. We assume that CP
and CN are disjoint.
For the syntax we build upon [4, 5, 17]. We have three disjoint sets of
constants: one for users identifiers denoted by User :U ; one for roles denoted
by Role :R; and one for services denoted by WebServ :S.
The predicates can be divided into three classes: predicates for assign-
ments of users to roles and services (Fig. 1a), predicates for credentials
(Fig. 1b), and predicates describing the current status of the system. The
last class of predicates keeps track on the main activities done by users and
services, such as: a predicate specifying successful activation of services by
users; a predicate for successful completion of services; its dual one for abor-
tion; predicates indicating granting a service to a user and, the opposite one,
denial user’s access to a service.
Furthermore, for some additional workflow constraints we need to have
some meta-level predicates that specify how many statements are true. We
use here a notation borrowed from Niemela smodels system, but we are sub-
stantially using the count predicates defined by Das [8]:
n ≤ {X. Pr} where n is a positive integer, X is a set of variables, and Pr
is a predicate, so that intuitively n ≤ {X. Pr} is true in a model if at
least n instances of the grounding of X variables in Pr are satisfied by
the model. The {X. Pr} ≤ n is the dual predicate.
We assume additional comparison predicates (for instance for equality or
inequalities) or some additional monadic predicates for instance to qualify
service, users, or keys for credentials.
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Role :Ri  Role :Rj when role Role :Ri dominates role Role :Rj .
Role :Ri WebServ:S Role :Rj when role Role :Ri dominates, just for service WebServ :
S, the role Role :Rj .
assign (P,WebServ :S) when an access to the service WebServ :S is granted to P .
P can be either a Role :R or User :U .
forced (P,WebServ :S) when access the service WebServ : S must be forced to P .
Principal P can be either a Role :R or User :U .
(a) Predicates for assignments to Roles and Services
declaration (User :U) it is a statement by the User :U for its identity.
credential (User :U,Role :R) when User :U has a credential activating Role :R.
credentialTask (User :U,WebServ :S) when User :U has the right to access WebServ :
S.
(b) Predicates for Credentials
Figure 1: Predicates used in the model
4 Logic Programming Background
Normal logic programs [1] are sets of rules of the form:
A ← B1, . . . , Bn, not C1, . . . , not Cm (1)
where A, Bi and Ci are (possibly ground) predicates among those described
in Section 3. A is called the head of the rule, each Bi is called a positive
literal and each not Cj is a negative literal, whereas the conjunction of the
Bi and not Cj is called the body of the rule. If the body is empty the rule is
called a fact. A normal logic program is a set of rules.
In our framework, we also need constraints that are rules with an empty
head.
← B1, . . . , Bn, not C1, . . . , not Cm (2)
One of the most prominent semantics for normal logic programs is the
stable model semantics proposed by Gelfond and Lifschitz [11] (see also [1]
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for an introduction). The intuition is to interpret the rules of a program P
as constraints on a solution set S (a set of ground atoms) for the program
itself. So, if S is a set of atoms, rule (1) is a constraint on S stating that if all
Bi are in S and none of Cj are in it, then A must be in S. A constraint (2)
is used to rule out from the set of acceptable models the situation in which
Bi are true and all Cj are false is not acceptable.
We now consider ground rules, i.e. rules where atoms do not contain
variables.
Definition 4.1 The reduct P S of a ground logic program P with respect to
a set of atoms S is the definite program obtained from P by deleting:
1. each rule that has a negative literal not C in its body with C ∈ S;
2. each negative literal in the bodies of the remaining rules.
The reduct P S is a definite logic program. Let M(P S) = MP S be the seman-
tics of the definite logic program P S, i.e. its minimal model.
Definition 4.2 A set of atoms S is a stable model of a normal logic program
P iff S = M(P S).
A program can have none, one or many stable models. The definition of stable
models captures the two key properties of solution sets of logic programs.
1. Stable models are minimal: a proper subset of a stable model is not a
stable model.
2. Stable models are grounded: each atom in a stable model has a justi-
fication in terms of the program, i.e. it is derivable from the reduct of
the program with respect to the model.
Though this definition of stable models in terms of fix points is non-
constructive there are constructive definitions [1] and systems [19, 16] that
can cope with ground programs having tens of thousands of rules.
Logic programs with variables can be given a semantics in terms of stable
models.
Definition 4.3 The stable models of a normal logic program P with vari-
ables are those of its ground instantiation PH with respect to its Herbrand
universe6.
6Essentially, we take all constants and functions appearing in the program and combine
them in all possible ways. This yields the Herbrand universe. Those terms are then used
to replace variables in all possible ways thus building its ground instantiation.
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If logic programs are function free, then an upper bound on the number of
instantiations is rcv, where r is the number of rules, c the number of the
constants, and v the upper bound on the number of distinct variables in each
rule.
Definition 4.4 (Logical Consequence and Consistency) Let P be a logic
program and L be a (positive or negative) ground literal. L is a logical conse-
quence of P (P |= L) if L is true in every stable model of P . P is consistent
(P 6|= ⊥) if there is a stable model for P .
Definition 4.5 (Abduction) Let P be a logic program, H a set of pred-
icates (called hypothesis, or abducibles), L a (positive or negative) ground
literal, and ≺ a p.o. over subsets of H, the cautious solution of the abduc-
tion problem is a set of ground atoms E such that
1. E is a set ground instances of predicates in H,
2. P ∪ E |= L
3. P ∪ E 6|= ⊥
4. any set E ′ ≺ E does not satisfy all conditions above
Traditional p.o.s are subset containment or set cardinality. Other solutions
are possible with orderings over predicates.
5 The Logical Model
In this section we define the semantics of our logical model and give formal
definitions of the security policies introduced in Section 3.
Definition 5.1 An access control policy PA is a logic program over the pred-
icates defined in Section 3 in which (i) no credential and no execution atom
can occur in the head of a rule, (ii) role hierarchy atoms occur as facts, (iii)
for every rule containing a head A which is the (possibly ground instance of)
predicate forced (P, WebServ :S) there is the (possibly ground instance of) rule
assign (P, WebServ :S)←forced (P, WebServ :S).
An access request is a ground instance of an assign (User :U, WebServ :S)
predicate.
The request r is a security consequence of a policy PA if (i) PA is logically
consistent and (ii) r is a logical consequence of PA.
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In contrast to the proposal by Bertino et al. [4] for workflows we don’t
need any special rule for determining which services cannot be executed and
which services must be executed by a specific user or role. The forced (, )
predicate and the constraints guarantee the same result.
Example 1 Consider a security policy in which having a credential for the
role accountant is incompatible with the assignment of any role manager, and
that the execution of a service phoneCall from user billG requires that the
service answer must be executed by anybody having the role headOfStaff .
The following rules guarantees the desired behavior:
←credential (User :U, Role :accountant), assign (User :U, Role :manager).
forced (Role :headOfStaff, WebServ :answer)←
running (User :billG, WebServ :call, number :N).
Example 2 Consider an e-stock portal where we have roles associated to
services as follows: role eSeller – for selling shares and bonds on the floor;
role eBuyer – for buying shares and bonds; role eAdvisor – used by accred-
ited consultants to sell their advice to other customers of the portal. Then
examine the case where one could send the eAdvisor credential to the service
publishing advisories and suggest to sell shares, and at the same time the
eBuyer credential to the service hosting bids.
In such situations we can define separation of duty rules:
customer(eSeller)←.
customer(eBuyer)←.
←assign (User :U, Role :R1), customer(R1), assign (User :U, Role :eAdvisor).
The access control rule on reviewing selling bids is the following:
assign (User :U, WebServ :S) ← credential (User :U, Role :R),
assign (Role :R, WebServ :S).
assign (Role :R, WebServ :reviewSell) ← Role :R  Role :eSeller.
As mentioned, we will use the disclosure policy PD to decide which missing
credentials are to be asked from the client.
Definition 5.2 A disclosure policy PD is a logic program in which no role
hierarchy atom and no execution atom can occur in the head of a rule.
Definition 5.3 A credential c is disclosable if it is a logical consequence of
the disclosure policy PD and presented credentials CP (PD ∪ CP |= c).
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Example 3 Considering again the access policy in Example 2. A possible
(part of) the disclosure policy PD could be:
credential (User :U, Role :eUser)←declaration (User :U).
credential (User :U, Role :eSeller)←credential (User :U, Role :eUser).
credential (User :U, Role :eSellerV IP )←credential (User :U, Role :eSeller).
The second rule says: to reveal the need for a eSeller credential there should
be already a credential attesting the client as a valid user of the system to-
gether with a declaration of its identity.
So, the request assign (User :fm, WebServ :reviewSell) together with
credential (User :fm, Role :eUser) and declaration (User :fm) will yield a counter
request – credential (User :fm, Role :eSeller) – specifying the need for addi-
tional privileges necessitated to get the service.
Note that the need for a credential attesting the role eSellerVIP, disclosed
together with eSeller, should not be considered as a potential output by the
system because the ”intuition” says that eSeller is enough.
Remark 1 The choice of the partial order has a major impact in presence
of complex role hierarchies. The “intuitive” behavior of the abduction al-
gorithm for the extraction of the minimal set of security credentials is not
guaranteed by the straightforward interpretation of H (abducibles) as the set
of credentials and by the set cardinality or set containment orderings.
Consider the following program:
Role :r2  Role :r1 ← .
assign (User :U, WebServ :ws) ← credential (User :U, Role :R),
Role :R  Role :r1.
Request assign (User :fm, WebServ :ws) has two ⊆-minimal solutions:
{credential (User :fm, Role :r1)} , {credential (User :fm, Role :r2)}
Yet, our intuition is that the first should be the minimal one.
So, we need a more sophisticated partial order. For example, if E  E ′
is such that for all credentials c ∈ E there is a credential c′ ∈ E ′ where
c = c′, we can revise it so that E ≺ E ′ if c ∈ E there is a credential c′ ∈ E ′
where c′ is identical to c except that it contains a role R′ that dominates the
corresponding role R in c. This p.o. generates the “intuitive” behavior of
the abduction algorithm.
Another alternative, currently implemented in out prototype, is to include
extra information to credentials in the hypotheses (abducibles), specifying
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the position of a role in the role-lattice hierarchy. Then it is easy to select
the set(s) with the lowest role-position values. After having obtained the
missing credentials, we drop this extra information from the set that is to be
sent back to the client.
Definition 5.4 (Fair Access) Let PA be an access control policy, let CD be
the set of ground instances of credentials occurring in PA, and let ≺ be a
p.o. over subsets of CD. The policy PA guarantees ≺-fair access if for any
ground request r that is an instance of a head of a rule in PA there exists a
set CM ⊆ CD that is a solution of the abduction problem.
Definition 5.5 (Fair Interaction) Let PA and PD be, respectively, an ac-
cess and disclosure control policies, and let CD be the set of ground instances
of credentials occurring in PA, and let ≺ be a p.o. over subsets of CD. The
policies guarantee ≺-fair interaction w.r.t. a set of initial credentials CI if
(i) PA guarantees ≺-fair access and (ii) for any solution of the abduction
problem CM ⊆ CD and any credential c ∈ CM if it PD ∪ CI |= c. If the set CI
only contains declarations then the disclosure is unlimited.
The above process does not take into account the progressive disclosure of
credentials in the interactive process.
Remark 2 It is possible to define a process of trust negotiation along the
lines of Yu et al. [21] if at each interaction step we ask only for the credentials
that are entailed by a 1-step deduction over PD and CP . In this case, the
interaction policy must be a monotonic logic program.
6 Reasoning
In this section we show how the various notions that we have seen so far
can be combined into a complete authorization mechanism. PolicyEvaluator
receives the request r, processes it according to the access control algorithm
and eventually takes a decision. A decision may have involved interactions
and so we also keep track of the current set of active credentials and the
history of the requests made by the client.
Since the client must collect all relevant credentials (if required) for get-
ting access to a service, one could borrow mechanisms for discovering dis-
tributed credentials’ chains from [18, 7].
Once again it is worth noting that this view is partial as we only focus
on the knowledge of one single partner: there is no authorization domain
crossing partnerships.
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To allow for an easier grasp of the problem, we start with a basic frame-
work shown in Figure 2. This approach is the cornerstone of most logical
formalizations [9].
1. verify that the request is a logical consequence of the creden-
tials, namely PA ∪ CP |= r
2. if the check succeeds then grant access else deny access
Figure 2: Traditional Access Control
A number of works has deemed such blunt denials unsatisfactory and
therefore it has been proposed by Bonatti and Samarati [5] and Yu et al.
[21] to send back to the client some of the rules that are necessary to gain
additional access (see Figure 3). In their work it is revised to allow for the
flow of rules and information to users.
1. verify that the request is a logical consequence of the creden-
tials, namely PA ∪ CP |= r
2. if the check succeeds then access is granted, otherwise select
some rule r ← p ∈ PartialEvaluation(PA ∪ CP) and send
the rule back to the client
Figure 3: Disclosable Access Control
Since the systems proposed by both Bonatti and Samarati [5] and Yu et
al. [21] are flat, in p the client will find all missing credentials to continue
the process until r is granted.
In many cases, this is neither sufficient nor desirable. For instance, if the
policy is not flat, it has constraints on the credentials that can be presented
at the same time (e.g., separation of duties) or a more complex role structure
is used, these systems would not be complete. Also repeated queries allow
for the disclosure of the entire policy, which might well be undesirable7.
7In the negotiation process of Yu et al. [21] rules are only disclosed when all preliminary
credentials have been already sent by the client. Still this is unsatisfactory because we
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Another point in our formal model, worth discussing here, is the way we
address the disjunctive information in the partner’s disclosure policy (e.g.,
“present either a VISA or a Mastercard or an American Express card”). In
presence of such disjunctive information an arbitrary disjunct will be selected
and on the next interaction step (if the client has declined the credential) the
abduction algorithm is informed that the previous solution was not accepted.
We approach this by discarding the set of declined credentials from the set of
newly computed disclosable credentials. In this case the abduction algorithm
does not consider the declined credentials, from the last step, in the next
interaction step.
Our interactive access control solution for Web Services is shown in Figure
4.
1. extract from the client’s input the set of presented credentials CP and
the set of declined credentials CN
2. verify that the request is a logical consequence of the credentials, namely
PA ∪ CP |= r
3. if the check succeeds then access is granted, otherwise
(a) compute the set of disclosable credentials CD as
CD = {c | c credential that PD ∪ CP |= c} \ CN
(b) use abduction to find a minimal set of missing credentials CM ⊆ CD
such that both PA ∪ CP ∪ CM |= r and PA ∪ CP ∪ CM 6|= ⊥
(c) if no such set exists then ⊥ is sent back to the user,
(d) otherwise communicate the set of missing credentials CM back to
the client and iterate the process.
Figure 4: Interactive Access Control for Stateless WS
This is all we need for business processes made up by stateless web ser-
vices, in which all decisions are taken on the basis of the current input set of
credentials, and which envisaged to be the large majority.
This type of decision is characteristic of most logical approaches to access
control [17, 4, 5]: we only look at the policy, the request and the set of
credentials. The failure of the access control process at step 3c (Fig. 4) may
may well want to tell a user all credentials we may possibly ask him, but not how we are
going to evaluate them.
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be due to the presence of badly designed constraints for separation of duties
such that no possible set of credentials can unlock the service r. In same
cases this might also be a feature of the systems.
7 Implementation of the Logical Model
For the implementation of the algorithm in Figure 4 we used DLV (a dis-
junctive datalog system with negations and constraints) as a core engine for
the basic functionalities of deduction and abduction. The disjunctive data-
log front-end (the default one) is used for deductive computations while the
diagnosis front-end is used for abductive computations. We refer to Section
5 for definitions of deduction and abduction.
What follows is a step-by-step description of the implementation employ-
ing the DLV system:
1. Extract from the client’s input the two sets of credentials CP and CN ,
transform them to predicates suitable for the underlying formal model
(ref. Fig. 1) and store them in temporary files;
2. Use the DLV’s disjunctive datalog front-end. Specify as input the part-
ner’s access policy, the two sets from step 1 and the service request r
marked as a query over the models computed by DLV. The output of
this step are those models of the access policy in which r is true.
3. If it exists a model in step 2 that satisfies r then grant, otherwise:
(a) use again the DLV’s front-end as input partner’s disclosure policy
PD together with presented credentials CP . In this case DLV com-
putes all models of PD that are disclosable by CP . Then from the
computed models we remove all credentials that belongs to CN .
(b) find a model, out of the ones in step 3a, for which it exists a sub-
set satisfying the abductive computation described below. Use the
abductive diagnosis (subset minimal) front-end with the following
input: PA, CP , the set of credentials from the model being checked
stored in a temporary file with special extension .hyp (called hy-
potheses or abducibles) and the service request r also stored in
a temporary file with extension .obs (observations). The output
of such computation are all possible subsets of the hypotheses
that satisfy the observations. In that way we find all possible
missing sets of credentials satisfying r. Then we filter them, first
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against role-minimality criterion, and then against set cardinal-
ity criterion. The former filters those sets with lowest possible
role-position values and the latter filters the ones with minimal
cardinality.
(c) if no such set exists reject otherwise send the missing set back to
the client.
Remark 3 The sequence, the two criteria, set cardinality and role mini-
mality makes sense in different contexts. The sequence role minimality/ set
cardinality, tries to keep the minimal set as lower in the role hierarchy as
possible, i.e. selects those sets that have a larger number of not so powerful
roles. The other alternative, set cardinality/ role minimality, selects those
sets with fewer roles but with higher privileges.
The latter may be useful if getting or transmitting credentials is expensive
(e.g., in a mobile setting).
8 Stateful Business Processes
If the authorization decisions of business processes are stateful, and the corre-
sponding workflow of the partners has constraints on the execution of future
services on the basis of past services this solution is not adequate enough.
For instance in the workflow example described by Atluri and Bertino [4,
pag.67] a branch manager of a bank clearing a cheque cannot be the same
member of staff who has emitted the cheque. The problems are the following:
• the request may be inconsistent with some role that the user has taken
up in the past;
• the new set of credential may be inconsistent with requirements such
as separation of duties;
• in contrast to intra-enterprise workflow systems [4], the partner offering
the web service has no way to assign to the client the right set of
credentials for consistency future request.
So, this means that we must have some roll-back procedure by which, if the
user has by chance sent the “wrong” credentials, he has some revocation
mechanism to drop them. A preliminary solution has been described in [15].
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9 Future and Ongoing Work
There are a number of issues that are currently the subject of research to
improve the usability of our system. Following are the key points in our
future and ongoing work.
The current system processes credentials at an high level: defines what
can be inferred and what is missing from a partner’s access policy and a
user’s set of credentials. There is the need of a suitable platform for the
actual distributed management of credentials at lower levels (namely actual
cryptographic verification of credentials). We decided to use PERMIS infras-
tructure [6] because it incorporates and deals entirely with X.509 Identity and
Attribute Certificates. It allows for creating, allocating, storing and validat-
ing such certificates. Since PERMIS conforms to well-defined standards we
can easily interoperate with the other entities (partners) in a BP.
Next step in the framework is to use algorithms for credentials’ chain
discovery as in [18, 7]. Then, once a client collects all credentials and supplies
them back to the service provider, it can be used, as a preprocessing step
(before running the access control procedure), for tracking all credentials
provided by him.
Since we are at an initial stage of our prototype, we have only run limited
experiments. Substantial large scale experiments are yet to be worked out
to determine the running performance of the algorithm. Cassandra, a role
based policy language, and its policies for the UK’s EHR could be a good
candidate for a benchmark [3].
10 Conclusions
In this paper we proposed a logical framework for reasoning about access
control for stateless business processes for web services. Our formal model
for reasoning on access control is based on variants of Datalog with the stable
model semantics and combines in a novel way a number of features: the logic
for trust management by Li et al. [17]; the logic for workflow access control
by Bertino et al. [4]; the logic for controlling the release of information by
Bonatti and Samarati [5].
We identified the different reasoning tasks (deduction, abduction, consis-
tency checking) that characterize the problem and clarify the problems of
temporal evolution of the logical model.
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